As of March 2020, with the support of Russia and Iran, the Syrian regime increased its control to approximately 60 per cent of the country’s territory. It regained control of most of the areas previously held by opposition factions in Aleppo, Daraa, Eastern Ghouta, southern Damascus, Homs, and Hama. Yet these developments have not translated into stability or security. Daraa is the best example of the lack of security and the failure of regime policies. This consolidation of territorial control has not increased the population under government rule, since Syrians have fled almost every area that the regime captured. More than 13 million Syrians—54 per cent of the pre-war population—are currently displaced outside the country and in areas beyond the regime’s control.
However, the Syrian regime and Russia are pushing a normalization narrative in an attempt to create a misleading image of life getting “back to normal” in Syria, and the false notion that regime-controlled areas are safe. This narrative is used as a premise for a disingenuous call to start the premature return of displaced Syrians in order to pressure the international community to fund reconstruction and the restoration of basic services in areas under the regime’s control.
The regime defines a “safe environment” as the absence of military offensives and full-scale operations. However, a truly safe situation entails a much wider range of issues, conditions, and rights that must be provided to all Syrians. These broader considerations are prerequisites for the return of displaced people and for a comprehensive and sustainable political solution in Syria.
The Syrian regime and its allies were the only parties conducting full-scale military assaults on civilian areas in Syria during 2019–2020. In Hama, Idlib and Aleppo, the regime’s attacks shattered its own definition of “safe environment”, causing the displacement of an additional 1.3 million IDPs during this period. While such a narrative is expected from the Syrian regime and its allies, it is concerning that some Western governments are starting to adopt a similar definition of a “safe environment” in Syria. This report highlights Syrians’ own feelings and views of safety within this environment, through an extensive survey and analysis. In an upcoming document, the SACD will present in detail the conditions for a safe environment as defined by the Syrians themselves.
The reconciliation areas present the worse deterioration in the sense of insecurity amongst survey respondents. While 74 per cent of participants in the SACD’s 2019 survey reported not feeling safe in their areas, this figure increased to 94 per cent in the 2020 survey. Surprisingly, the same trend was observed in areas controlled by the regime since 2011, where perceptions of insecurity jumped from 39 per cent in 2019 to 51 per cent in 2020. These numbers clearly indicate that the reconciliation areas have failed to provide security to citizens, and that the regime’s security policies and general practices are weakening the sense of security amongst Syrians.
Although the overall percentage of Syrians who were arrested or had a relative arrested in the last 10 years dropped from 53 per cent in 2019 to 40 per cent in 2020, it rose considerably in reconciliation areas during this period from 64 per cent to 89 per cent. This is another clear indication of the failure of the reconciliation agreements. The percentage of arrested people decreased for two main reasons. First, the sample size increased and covered a wider range of provinces, some of which, like Latakia, were less affected by regime security policies. Second, the regime had already targeted most of the dissidents in the areas under its control by 2019, or forced their displacement.
People forced to return to regime control from displacement or through “reconciliation” do not feel safe, with significantly higher levels of fear in their daily lives. Their feeling of insecurity is being informed by events that were directly witnessed or experienced. Some 50% of people in the Assad-controlled areas don’t feel safe, including those who never left; 67% of returnees from outside Syria don’t feel safe, and those in the reconciliation areas fear worst with 94% saying they don’t feel safe. Most cite the security authorities’ grip and fear of rampant insecurity and crime as their reasons for feeling safe. That said, there are no safe areas, with some of the more practical measures of safety showing that security is poor everywhere, because it’s due to security policies by the same authority.